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THE USE OF NON-JUDICIAL PROCEDURES TO RESOLVE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS*
Charles B. Craver**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the number of employment discrimination complaints filed in
federal district courts has almost tripled from 8,413 in 1990 to 22,412 in 1999.1 These civil rights
cases now account for 8.6 percent of the 261,651 civil actions filed in federal courts in 1999.2
Plaintiffs prevail in less than one-third of the employment discrimination cases culminating in
verdicts, generating median awards of $137,000 in 1998.3 It is thus apparent that employment
discrimination cases consume a significant amount of federal court resources, despite the
relatively low monetary value of such cases.
Two factors have contributed significantly to the increase in employment discrimination
litigation over the past ten years. The first is the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)4 which extends civil rights protection to individuals with mental and physical disabilities.
The second is the Civil Rights Act of 19915 which authorizes the awarding of compensatory and
punitive damages in discriminatory treatment cases.6
Congress was understandably aware of the increased litigation that would be generated by
the enactment of the ADA and the new compensatory and punitive damages provision. In an
effort to ameliorate the impact of these developments on federal district court case loads,
Congress included Section 118 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations,
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts
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or provisions of Federal law amended by this title.7
The use of voluntary dispute resolution techniques has contributed to the non-judicial
resolution of many employment discrimination claims. Nonetheless, the number of employment
discrimination complaints filed in federal district courts continues to rise. Federal judges often
complain informally about the increasing amount of judicial time spent on such relatively low
value cases. They wish Congress would find a way to resolve these employment claims without
resort to protracted and expensive federal court adjudications.
This article will explore non-judicial dispute resolution procedures that could be used to
handle employment discrimination cases. The starting point must be more thorough and more
expeditious investigations by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) personnel to
provide claimants and respondents with more definitive information regarding the merits of
discrimination allegations. As part of the investigative process, EEOC employees or outside
neutrals should be required to encourage settlement discussions between charging parties and
respondents, and should be empowered to provide mediation assistance when parties encounter
settlement difficulties.
When voluntary settlements are not achieved through inter-party negotiations and
mediator assisted discussions, resort to binding arbitration might be appropriate. Should arbitral
procedures be voluntary or compulsory? Should a distinction be made between arbitrations
conducted under collective bargaining agreement provisions negotiated by labor and
management representatives where labor organizations represent grieving workers and arbitral
procedures established unilaterally by nonunion employers who determine the basic procedural
rules and may select and compensate the arbitrators? If arbitral adjudications are authorized, what
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degree of judicial deference should be given by courts asked to review those awards?
When arbitral procedures are not available, should Congress amend the civil rights
statutes to authorize the EEOC to resolve discrimination claims through administrative
adjudications? The EEOC could be given power similar to that currently possessed by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Should final administrative adjudications be selfenforcing or subject to judicial confirmation? What judicial deference should be given to EEOC
factual and legal conclusions? Would mandated administrative adjudications deprive litigants of
their Seventh Amendment right to jury trials?
II. THOROUGH AND EXPEDITIOUS EEOC CHARGE INVESTIGATIONS
Approximately 80,000 charges of employment discrimination are filed with the EEOC
each year.8 Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, the EEOC is given 180 days to investigate
each charge and to seek the amicable resolution of meritorious claims. Because of limited
financial resources, the EEOC is unable to complete meaningful investigations within the 180
day time frame of more than two-thirds of charges filed.9 As a result, the agency frequently fails
to make formal “cause” determinations in which it finds “cause” or “no cause” to believe
violations have occurred. After passage of the 180 day statutory period, charging parties or their
attorneys may request “right-to-sue” letters authorizing the initiation of law suits.
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of investigations carried out by EEOC
personnel result in no-cause determinations. Agency representatives make “cause” findings with
respect to only 5 percent of charges that are investigated.10 These data suggest that thousands of
discrimination charges are filed by suspicious employees who were most likely not the victims of
unlawful discrimination. Many involve individuals who have been laid off and who are hoping to
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obtain severance benefits from employers who are under no contractual duty to provide such
payments. In the 5 percent of cases in which “cause” is found, respondents feel pressure to seek
amicable resolutions through the negotiation process, so they can avoid costly and protracted
federal litigation.
It is noteworthy that employment discrimination plaintiffs prevail in fewer than one-third
of federal court adjudications.11 Many of the cases resulting in verdicts for defendants are cases
in which no EEOC cause determinations were ever made. If the EEOC were financed sufficiently
to permit thorough investigations of all charges, the federal government would actually save
money. Most discrimination claimants are not sure why they were denied initial employment or
were terminated. Individuals from groups that have historically suffered from discrimination
often suspect discriminatory treatment even when the decisions were based on nondiscriminatory considerations. Due to a lack of definitive information, the adversely affected
individuals file discrimination charges with the EEOC in an effort to determine the real reasons
for the negative actions taken against them.
Charging parties who believe that EEOC personnel have professionally and fairly
investigated discrimination claims and found no cause to believe violations have occurred might
accept those advisory opinions and abstain from further legal action. Some claimants who are not
completely satisfied with negative EEOC determinations might also be forced to forego judicial
action, because of their inability to retain legal counsel. Most plaintiff attorneys take civil rights
cases on contingent fee bases. It they thought that negative EEOC conclusions were fair and
accurate, they would be unlikely to accept cases they would find difficult to win. The additional
funding needed to enable the EEOC to conduct thorough investigations of all charges would be
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substantially less than the savings that would result from the reduction in federal court
employment discrimination adjudications.
The lack of thorough EEOC investigations also affects respondents. Most employers and
labor organizations accused of discriminatory behavior conduct internal investigations. Since
most of their information comes from the individuals who made the employment determinations
being challenged, they are often told that the decisions were based on non-discriminatory
considerations. The EEOC has access to more relevant information – especially from charging
parties and their witnesses. If the EEOC were to conduct more thorough investigations and found
cause to believe violations had occurred, respondents would be likely to treat these findings
seriously. In the vast majority of cases in which no-cause findings resulted, many charging
parties would accept those determinations. This would decrease the pressure on respondents to
offer charging parties thousands of dollars to avoid the high costs of litigation.
Thorough EEOC investigations provide EEOC personnel with additional authority. Once
they have interviewed the relevant individuals and determined that violations may have occurred,
they are in optimal positions to facilitate settlement discussions. Without such information, they
lack the persuasive authority needed to induce respondents to consider seriously the need to settle
claims they may eventually lose if those cases are taken to federal courts.

III. NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION/CONCILIATION, AND ADVISORY MINITRIALS
The vast majority of legal disputes are resolved through settlement negotiations. The
disputing parties – or their representatives – get together and attempt to achieve mutually
acceptable resolutions. These discussions may take place before formal discrimination claims
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have been filed, or after charges have been filed with state fair employment practice agencies or
the EEOC. In some cases, however, neither side is willing to initiate settlement discussions
because they fear that such actions would exude weakness.
A. INTERNAL FIRM CONCILIATION
Most business firms have adopted anti-discrimination policies that forbid discrimination
that would contravene federal, state, or local employment discrimination enactments. These
companies conduct regular training programs to apprise supervisors and employees of the
applicable nondiscrimination rules. These policies usually include procedures to be used in case
of alleged violations. EEO officers are appointed who possess the authority to receive and
investigate claims of discrimination. When allegations are raised, these individuals meet with the
relepant parties to determine whether discrimination may have occurred.
When EEO officers decide that discrimination may have taken place, they usually
endeavor to generate mutually acceptable resolutions. In some cases, they may encourage the
aggrieved persons to meet directly with the alleged offenders. In controlled environments, the
EEO officers let the participants express their feelings and attempt to facilitate settlement
discussions. The EEO officers maintain order and assist the parties to explore different settlement
possibilities. When face-to-face meetings would not be appropriate, EEO officers meet separately
with the relevant parties and carry messages back and forth.
If informal settlement efforts do not produce acceptable results, more formal discussions
may take place. Employee relations specialists may schedule meetings between the aggrieved
persons and the alleged offenders. Because of the more formal atmosphere surrounding these
discussions, the parties may feel greater pressure to work together – and through the firm
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intermediaries – to resolve their differences.
Some business firms have formal mediation programs which employ company-trained
facilitators or outside neutrals. These mediators may conduct joint meetings with the disputing
parties or use separate caucus sessions to explore settlement possibilities. These settlement
facilitators have usually received special training with respect to both substantive employment
discrimination laws and the mediation process. When internal business mediation procedures
function effectively, they generate settlement agreements that avoid the need for further
proceedings.
B. EEOC CONCILIATION/MEDIATION
Aggrieved individuals who are not satisfied with internal firm resolution procedures
generally file charges with state anti-discrimination agencies or the EEOC. At this point, the
respondent employers are notified of the claimant allegations. Whenever possible, state agency or
EEOC personnel investigate the charge allegations. They contact pertinent witnesses or
participants and try to determine if unlawful discrimination may have taken place.
1. Informal EEOC Conciliation
When state agency or EEOC investigators meet with respondent representatives, they
often facilitate settlement discussions. If the investigators think that discrimination may have
occurred, they share the relevant information with firm officials and encourage settlement talks.
If respondents think that “cause” determination will result, they often move quickly to achieve
amicable resolutions to avoid the need for attorney involvement. At this stage, most charging
parties are not represented by legal counsel, with most claimants only seeking legal assistance
after they have received their right-to-sue letters from the EEOC.
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2. Formal EEOC Mediation
In recent years, the EEOC has recognized that informal facilitation efforts by agency
investigators do not always produce the desired outcomes. As a result, the EEOC began to
experiment with more formal mediation programs. Such procedures were initially established at
district offices. When these programs proved successful, the agency decided to create a national
mediation system. Under the new system adopted in early 1999, Intake Investigators
preliminarily evaluate discrimination claims and try to determine whether these charges appear to
have merit. Apparently meritorious charges are assigned an “A” status.12 If additional
information is required before reasonable “cause” determination could be made, a “B” status is
assigned. Charges that preliminarily appear to lack merit are given a “C” status.
Charges assigned an “A” or “B” status by Intake Investigators fall within the EEOC’s
voluntary mediation program. Charging parties and respondents are encouraged to submit to
agency mediation. This usually occurs within sixty days following the filing of the charges and
prior to thorough EEOC investigations.13 EEOC staff members and outside mediators have been
used to conduct the conciliation sessions. Even though the agency’s expedited mediation system
causes both charging parties and respondents to engage in mediator-assisted settlement
discussions before they have had the opportunity to conduct thorough investigations, the
preliminary data indicate that the EEOC’s new mediation program has been functioning well.
In 1998, the year before the agency’s nation-wide mediation program was established,
only 1631 charges were resolved through conciliation. During 1999, however, 4833 charges were
successfully mediated.14 In fact, the settlement success rate during 1999 for mediator-assisted
claims was an impressive 65 percent of submitted claims.15 Ninety-one percent of charging
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parties who participated in EEOC mediation would use that mechanism again, as would 96
percent of respondent-employers.16
Many EEOC mediation sessions took place before attorneys were retained by claimants.
Only 41 percent of charging parties had already retained legal counsel, compared with 58 percent
of employers.17 This fact would indicate the substantial amount of legal fees saved through the
EEOC’s mediation program. The conciliation efforts during 1999 also avoided the possible
litigation of almost 5000 additional cases in federal courts.
Mediation provides significant benefits over arbitral or judicial litigation. Adjudications
produce “win”-“lose” results. Although prevailing parties may initially appreciate their victories,
winning plaintiffs who are ordered hired or reinstated by discriminating employers may find far
less hospitable employment environments than they would have found if their new employment
status had resulted from mediator-assisted settlement agreements reached by both parties.
Negotiated and mediator-assisted settlement agreements usually result in “win”-“win”
resolutions. The parties control their own destinies and only have to effectuate the terms they find
acceptable. They may agree to arrangements courts could not order. For example, employers may
apologize to charging parties for any discrimination that may have occurred, and this can have a
salutary impact. Employers can explain to newly hired or reinstated claimants their concern about
adequate employee performance. This may let those claimants understand what is expected of
them after they are at work.
Despite the obvious success of the EEOC’s mediation program, it has already been
endangered by Congressional budget reductions. The agency initially received $13 million to
implement the new program, but lost that funding the following year.18 Although the EEOC has
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tried to absorb the $8 million cost of continued mediation, it has had to rely more on staff
mediators than outside facilitators. This has made it difficult for the agency to continue to offer
mediation assistance to all appropriate parties.
Congress should provide increased funding to support the EEOC’s mediation program.
Every dollar expended in mediation will save several dollars in judicial costs if the cases now
being resolved through mediation were to end up in federal court. The EEOC should also be
encouraged to expand its program. All federal district courts now have local rules requiring civil
litigants to participate in judicial settlement conferences. The EEOC should adopt rules requiring
all charging parties and respondents in cases given an “A” or “B” status by Intake Investigators to
participate in mediation sessions. EEOC staff members may function effectively as mediators,
but outside neutrals must also be provided to parties that may fear that agency mediators may
philosophically favor claimants.
Mediators should initially conduct joint sessions during which both sides can explain
their respective positions.19 This can have a cathartic impact, and insure that both sides appreciate
each other’s perspectives. This is especially important for individual claimants who feel that
employers have failed to appreciate the emotional distress they have experienced because of
unlawful discrimination. If meaningful inter-party negotiations are generated, their direct
interaction should be encouraged. When joint sessions begin to deteriorate, separate caucus
sessions may be used to permit the neutral facilitators to look for mutually beneficial tradeoffs.20
When parties have strong factual disagreements, mini-trials may be employed to educate the
disputants.21 The presiding neutral can require employer officials to be present with the charging
party. Both sides can summarize their evidence. The mediator can then discuss the strengths and
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weaknesses of the evidence in an effort to regenerate stalled negotiations. While some mediators
may decline to offer their opinion of the likely outcome if the case were to be adjudicated, other
neutrals may be willing to provide the parties with a general evaluation of the probable result if
the case were to be tried.
In some cases, the neutral facilitator may offer to conduct an advisory summary jury
trial.22 They could ask five or six individuals from the local community to act as jurors, and have
the charging party and the respondent present their evidence in an abbreviated manner. Once the
evidence has been heard, the jury panel is asked to indicate how they think the case should be
resolved. Once the disputants appreciate how disinterested jurors view the situation, they can
engage in more enlightened settlement discussions.
Litigators often underestimate the benefits that may be derived from proficient mediation
assistance. On many occasions, these advocates conclude that negotiated resolutions are no
longer possible, even when they are. Professors Stephen Goldberg and Jeanne Brett demonstrated
that pre-arbitration mediation can be used to successfully resolve approximately 85 percent of
grievance disputes that were otherwise destined for arbitral adjudication under applicable
collective bargaining agreements.23 These findings would indicate that a substantial percentage of
employment discrimination claims that are headed toward judicial resolution may be mutually
settled with effective mediator assistance.
3. Mediator Styles
Proficient mediators tend to possess common characteristics no matter what styles they
employ. They are objective individuals who have excellent communication skills. They are good
active listeners and assertive speakers. They have good interpersonal skills that enable them to
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interact well with people from diverse backgrounds. They understand the negotiation process and
the way in which conciliators can enhance that process.
Mediators tend to employ one of three diverse styles. Some focus primarily on the
substantive terms being discussed.24 They try to determine what provisions the parties would be
willing to accept, and work to induce the disputants to agree to those terms. The substanceoriented neutrals function as “deal makers.” They often meet separately with the parties and try to
ascertain the optimal terms they think would be mutually acceptable. Once they reach this point,
they work to convince the parties to accept these provisions. If one or both parties ask about other
possibilities, substance-oriented mediators inform them that these are the only terms that would
work for both sides. This approach is most beneficial for inexperienced negotiators who do not
know how to reach their own agreement.
The substance-oriented approach is usually unsatisfactory for employment discrimination
disputes, because this style deprives the disputants of the benefits to be derived from face-to-face
negotiations. Emotionally distraught claimants are deprived of the catharsis that can be an
important part of the healing process. Both claimants and respondents are denied the chance to
fully appreciate each other’s positions, with all communication being controlled by the mediator.
Most mediators employ a process-oriented style.25 They seek to reopen clogged
communication channels and encourage direct inter-party negotiations. These neutrals function
as “orchestra leaders.” They bring the disputing parties together and work to regenerate stalled
settlement discussions. They prefer joint sessions, and only resort to separate caucus meetings
when absolutely necessary. They let the parties determine what is best for themselves. Processoriented mediators are appreciated by skilled negotiators who want minimal bargaining
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assistance and who want to control their own bargaining outcomes.
An innovative group of neutral facilitators have recently begun to use a relationshiporiented approach.26 They reject substance-oriented and process-oriented intervention in facor of
a style that is designed to transform disputants into relatively self-sufficient problem solvers.
They believe that mediators should strive to empower weaker parties by demonstrating the rights
and options available to the participants. They also work to generate mutual respect
(“recognition”) between the parties by inducing each to appreciate the perspective of the other.
They think that empowered participants who truly appreciate the viewpoints of their opponents
can optimally work to achieve their own mutually acceptable solutions. This style is appreciated
by claimants who are often unable to see beneficial ways out of their predicaments. Relationshiporiented facilitators do not consider final settlements critical. They are more interested in
teaching disputants how to resolve their own future controversies. This can be a problem for
employment discrimination claimants and respondents who are primarily seeking mutually
beneficial resolutions of their underlying conflicts.
4. Mediator Qualifications and Compensation
If the EEOC wishes to create a nation-wide mediation program that can assist all charging
parties and respondents to resolve colorable employment discrimination claims, it must use both
internal and outside neutrals. It would be virtually impossible for the agency to use only agencyemployed facilitators, because of budget limitations. A wholly internal mediation system would
also create problems with respect to those respondents that would be suspicious about the
neutrality of individuals working for an agency dedicated to the eradication of discrimination. It
would thus be appropriate to employ outside neutrals who would not be considered
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philosophically biased in favor of charging parties.
Individuals who want to become EEOC approved mediators should be required to
demonstrate three things: (1) absence of any apparent bias in favor of charging parties or
respondents; (2) possession of a basic knowledge of employment discrimination law prohibitions
and of proof constructs; and (3) an understanding of the mediation process. The EEOC should
seek process-oriented and relationship-oriented neutrals who respect party autonomy and try to
avoid the imposition of final terms. Substance-oriented mediators should be avoided, because
they would be likely to deprive claimants of real catharsis and appear to impose final terms that
might not be truly acceptable to both sides.
In 1998, a consortium of prominent universities created the Alliance for Education in
Dispute Resolution.27 This group of educators is dedicated to the training of qualified civil rights
neutrals. They would require a minimum of forty hours of formal training, with half the time
devoted to substantive law and the other half to mediation principles.
The EEOC should establish a group of trained agency-employed mediators and a list of
qualified outside neutrals. Both groups should be required to have a minimum of forty hours of
special training through Alliance members or other appropriate educational programs designed to
provide conciliators with adequate substantive knowledge and basic dispute resolution skills. It
would be beneficial if these applicants already had some experience in the dispute resolution
field.
Whenever EEOC-employed conciliators are overloaded or the disputants request the
assistance of an outside neutral, the EEOC should appoint a qualified external facilitator. At the
conclusion of all mediations, the EEOC should ask the disputing parties to evaluate the work of
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the neutral intervenors. Did they appear to be knowledgeable about the substantive and
procedural doctrines? Did they function in a professional and unbiased manner? Did they appear
to possess good dispute resolution skills? Would the parties be willing to use these neutrals to
assist them with the resolution of future controversies? The EEOC should review all mediator
evaluations to be sure to retain only the names of proficient and impartial neutrals.
Who should pay the costs of outside mediators? If the parties were asked to split the costs
of such neutrals, the financial impact on charging parties might be excessive. On the other hand,
if respondents were asked to assume the full costs of such neutrals, the apparent impartiality of
those facilitators might be questioned. The optimal course would be to have the EEOC cover the
cost of external mediators. This would preserve the critical appearance of mediator impartiality,
and the increased agency cost would be more than offset by the avoidance of protracted judicial
adjudications with respect to amicably resolved claims.
IV. RESORT TO BINDING ARBITRATION
Throughout the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, the federal
government had a laissez faire policy toward private sector employer-employee relations.
Business firms could hire – or not hire – anyone they wished. Under the prevailing “employmentat-will” doctrine, companies had the right to terminate most workers at any time for good cause,
bad cause, or no cause at all.28 As a result, employees who did not have employment contracts
for definite terms could be legally terminated because of their race, color, religion, gender,
national origin, age, disability, or other similar consideration.
During the early part of the twentieth century, skilled workers represented by craft unions
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor were generally protected by “just cause”
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provisions in collective bargaining agreements that precluded worker discipline except for valid
reasons. These contractual restrictions on managerial discretion were usually enforced through
grievance-arbitration procedures that ultimately authorized external neutrals to review challenged
employer actions.
After the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,29 and the creation of the
industrial unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, union membership
grew rapidly.30 By the mid-1950s, union membership exceeded 17,000,000 and constituted 35
percent of nonagricultural workforce participants. Union representation thus provided millions of
employees with basic just cause protection against unjust terminations.
Non-union workers and many union workers continued to be subject to invidious forms
of employment discrimination. While some labor organizations sought to prohibit basic forms of
discrimination, most not only failed to seek anti-discrimination contractual provisions but also
engaged in discriminatory practices with respect to membership policies and collective
bargaining rights.31 The pervasive discrimination practiced by many employers and labor
organizations induced Congress to enact Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,32 which
proscribes employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.
Although the Supreme Court had held as early as 1944 that representative labor organizations
had a statutory obligation to represent all bargaining unit workers fairly and without invidious
discrimination,33 a number of unions did not cease their overtly discriminatory practices until the
enactment of Title VII.
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A. ARBITRAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
UNDER GARDNER-DENVER AND GILMER
By the 1970s, most labor organizations had obtained bargaining agreement provisions
banning discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, and national origin. These
contractual protections were usually enforced through private grievance-arbitration procedures
set forth in the applicable collective agreements. Individuals who thought they had been
subjected to impermissible discrimination filed grievances through their representative labor
organizations. Union and employer representatives sought to resolve these claims through
various steps of their grievance procedures. When negotiated settlements could not be achieved,
labor organizations had the right to invoke arbitration provisions. Private arbitrators heard these
disputes and rendered binding awards.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,34 the Supreme Court had to determine the
relationship, if any, between private arbitral determinations and public law suits filed in federal
courts under Title VII. Harrell Alexander, Sr., an African-American employee of the GardnerDenver Company, had been discharged for allegedly producing an excessive number of defective
parts. He challenged his dismissal under the just cause provision of the applicable bargaining
agreement, but made no explicit claim of racial discrimination even though the contract
specifically prohibited discrimination based on race or color. When Mr. Alexander’s case was
presented to an arbitrator, the union argued that his discharge was due to race discrimination.
Evidence was presented indicating that white workers with similar performance problems had
been transferred to other jobs and not been terminated. Despite these claims, the arbitrator found
just cause for Mr. Alexander’s discharge. The arbitral award, however, contained no reference to
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his claim of discriminatory treatment.
Mr. Alexander subsequently filed a law suit in federal district court under Title VII
challenging the legality of his dismissal. The district court dismissed his Title VII suit, on the
ground Mr. Alexander was bound by the prior arbitral award. The court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court emphasized two critical factors not adequately considered by the lower courts.
Congress enacted Title VII to protect individual employee rights and created the EEOC and
specific statutory enforcement procedures. The Court noted that labor arbitrators are only
empowered to enforce private contract rights, while the EEOC and federal courts are authorized
to enforce public anti-discrimination protections. The court then rejected the district court’s
reliance on both estoppel and election of remedies concepts, holding that Mr. Alexander did not
waive his right to judicial consideration of his Title VII claim by virtue of his decision to
participate in the contractual arbitration proceeding.
The Alexander Court rejected the contention that it would be unfair to employers to hold
them bound by arbitral determinations while allowing grievants to relitigate discrimination
claims lost before arbitrators in subsequent Title VII actions in federal courts. The Court further
noted that both employees and employers may continue to benefit from the availability of arbitral
procedures:
Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a
nondiscrimination clause similar to Title VII, and where arbitral
procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a
settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An
employer thus has an incentive to make available the conciliatory
and therapeutic process of arbitration which may satisfy an
employee’s perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus
saving the employer the expense and aggravation associated with a
lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong

19
incentive to arbitrate grievances . . .35
The Alexander Court refused to adopt a policy that would require federal courts to defer
to prior arbitral determinations where the proceedings were fair and the arbitrator was authorized
under the applicable contract to resolve the underlying discrimination issues.36 The Court said
that Congress intended for federal courts to assume final responsibility for the enforcement of
Title VII claims, and it concluded that deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with
that objective. The Court emphasized the informal nature of arbitral proceedings, with formal
evidentiary and discovery rules rarely being followed.
Although the Alexander Court held that civil rights plaintiffs have the right to de novo
court determinations of their Title VII claims despite previous arbitral awards rejecting their
discrimination claims under anti-discrimination provisions contained in bargaining agreements, it
did not entirely suggest that courts should ignore prior arbitral awards.
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee’s Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great
weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact,
specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator
on the basis of an adequate record.37
Since the vast majority of Title VII claims involve alleged discriminatory treatment – rather than
disparate impact38 – in which the claimant must factually establish that the employer was
motivated by impermissible considerations, lower courts may continue to respect previous
arbitral decisions that have fairly and carefully considered the underlying factual contentions.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,39 the Supreme Court was again asked to
evaluate the relationship between arbitral procedures and employment discrimination law
enforcement. Robert Gilmer was hired by a securities firm. He was required to register as a
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securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). His registration
application included a provision under which he agreed to arbitrate any claim arising between
him and his employer. After he was terminated at age 62, he filed an age discrimination charge
with the EEOC and subsequently initiated a law suit in federal district court. Interstate/Johnson
Lane filed a motion to compel Mr. Gilmer to arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) claim, based on the arbitration clause in Gilmer’s NYSE registration application
form. The district court denied the employer’s motion, based upon its interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s earlier Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. decision. It concluded that Congress
intended to protect civil rights claimants from the arbitral waiver of access to judicial forums.
The court of appeals reversed, because it found nothing in the ADEA to preclude enforcement of
such arbitral undertakings.
The Supreme Court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)40 was enacted to reverse
the historical judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements. It indicated that the FAA provides
for stays of federal district court proceedings when the underlying issues are subject to arbitral
resolution, and it held that these factors evidenced a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”41 The Court indicated that before the EEOC may initiate legal action on behalf of
charging parties, it must endeavor to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practices through
informal methods of conciliation. The Court thus found that resort to voluntary arbitration
procedures would be consistent with the statutory policy favoring resort to non-judicial dispute
resolution procedures.
The Gilmer Court carefully distinguished its prior Gardner-Denver holding by noting that
the arbitrator in Gardner-Denver was only empowered to enforce contractual – not statutory –
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rights. Under the NYSE arbitration rules, however, arbitrators were expressly authorized to
enforce the statutory rights of complaining employees. In addition, Mr. Alexander was required
under the applicable bargaining agreement provision to have his case presented to the arbitrator
by a union representative. The NYSE rules, on the other hand, allowed Mr. Gilmer to be
represented by an advocate of his own choosing. The Court thus decided to order Mr. Gilmer to
resort to NYSE arbitration before he could file any judicial action. The Court unfortunately failed
to indicate clearly what rights Mr. Gilmer would have to judicial redress if he ultimately lost his
arbitral case.
B. INCREASED JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE ARBITRAL RESOLUTION OF
STATUTORY CLAIMS
The Supreme Court’s Gilmer decision reflected a profound change in judicial philosophy
that had taken place over the prior forty years. In Wilko v. Swan,42 the Court had declined to
enforce an agreement requiring a securities purchaser to arbitrate any Securities Act claims that
might arise between the share purchaser and the brokerage firm. It concluded that the purchaser’s
right to invoke judicial procedures to enforce his statutory rights could not be negated by an
outstanding arbitration agreement. In 1974, the Gardner-Denver Court continued this policy
when it decided to permit Mr. Alexander to seek judicial redress for his Title VII claim despite
the prior arbitral award rejecting his discrimination allegations.
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court significantly modified its position with respect to
the relationship between arbitration agreements and access to federal courts when federal
statutory rights were being enforced. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,43 the Court held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws precludes parties from agreeing to
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arbitrate antitrust claims arising from their international commercial transactions. In
Shearson/American Express. Inc. v. McMahon,44 the Court held that brokerage firm customers
could be required to honor arbitration agreements requiring them to arbitrate claims under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Court emphasized the strong federal policy favoring the
enforcement of voluntary arbitration agreements, and it found nothing in the Securities Exchange
Act or RICO precluding arbitral resolution of statutory claims.
Although the McMahon Court distinguished Wilko v. Swan, it ultimately recognized that
the antipathy of Wilko toward arbitral undertakings could no longer be harmonized with the
decisions in Mitsubishi Motors and McMahon. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,45 the Court formally overruled Wilko as it sustained the use of arbitral procedures
to resolve different Securities Act claims. “To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.”46
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,47 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
support for the arbitral resolution of statutory claims. When Larketta Randolph purchased a
moblie home, she obtained the necessary financing from Green Tree Financial. The financing
agreement required Ms. Randolph to obtain insurance protecting Green Tree Financial from any
default by her, and it included a provision stating that all disputes between her and Green Tree
Financial would be resolved through binding arbitration. When Ms. Randolph subsequently sued
Green Tree Financial under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for failing to disclose the insurance
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requirement as a finance charge and under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for requiring her to
arbitrate her statutory claims, Green Tree Financial moved to compel arbitration of her dispute.
The district court directed Ms. Randolph to arbitrate her claims, but the court of appeals
reversed, because it found that the arbitration agreement failed to provide Ms. Randolph with the
minimum procedural guarantees she needed to enforce her TILA rights. The arbitration
agreement failed to specify which party had to pay for the costs of that procedure, and the risk
that Ms. Randolph would have to assume these costs undermined her ability to vindicate her
TILA claim.
The Supreme Court reiterated its support for Gilmer and Rodriguez de Quijas, holding
that federal statutory claims may be appropriately resolved through arbitration procedures. The
Court found that the lack of clarity regarding the party that would have to bear the costs of
arbitration insufficient to negate the historical federal policy in favor of arbitration. The Court
indicated that Ms. Randolph bore the burden of demonstrating that she would probably have to
bear the significant costs of arbitration and it found that she had failed to carry her burden in this
regard.
C. THE IMPACT OF CIRCUIT CITY STORES
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,48 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a
federal court could order arbitration of state civil rights claims. When Saint Clair Adams sought
employment with Circuit City Stores, he filled out an application form that contained a clause
stating that he would resolve all employment-related disputes through binding arbitration. Two
years after he was hired at the Santa Rosa, California, store, Mr. Adams filed claims in state court
under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and common law tort theories alleging

24
unlawful employment discrimination. Circuit City Stores filed suit in federal district court
seeking an injunction against the state court proceedings and an order directing Mr. Adams to
submit his state law claims to arbitration. The district court granted Circuit City Stores’ request,
but the Ninth Circuit Court reversed because it found that Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)49 excluded from coverage all contracts of employment.
The district court had acted pursuant to the authority set forth in Sections 2-4 of the
FAA50 which provide that arbitration agreements are enforceable in federal courts. Although
Section 1 excludes from coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,”51 the district court held
that this exclusion only covered individuals employed directly in interstate transportation. The
Ninth Circuit Court, however, rejected this interpretation, and held that the Section 1 exclusion
extended to all employment contracts.52
A closely-divided Supreme Court repudiated the Ninth Circuit Court’s interpretation of
Section 1. The five-Justice majority initially decided that employment application forms
constitute “contracts of employment” within the meaning of the FAA. The majority then
concluded that Congress only intended in Section 1 of the FAA to exclude employment contracts
pertaining to transportation workers. The Circuit City Stores Court thus held that Mr. Adams was
obliged to arbitrate his state law claims, and it sustained the authority of the federal district court
to enjoin the inconsistent state court proceedings.
D. PREREQUISITES TO JUDICIAL SUBMISSION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS TO ARBITRAL PROCEDURES
In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,53 the Supreme Court had the opportunity
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to clarify the circumstances in which contracting parties would be required to arbitrate their
statutory claims. Ceasar Wright was a longshore worker covered by a collective bargaining
agreement containing an arbitration clause. When his employer refused to continue to employ
him after his settlement of a workers compensation claim for permanent disability benefits, Mr.
Wright filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed
his ADA claim, because of his failure to pursue arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed, but the
Supreme Court reversed. It found that the grievance-arbitration provision did not clearly require
Mr. Wright to arbitrate his ADA claim.
The Wright Court recognized the apparent tension between its prior Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer decisions. “Whereas Gardner-Denver stated that ‘an employee’s rights under Title VII
are not susceptible of prospective waiver,’ ... Gilmer held that the right to a federal judicial forum
for an ADEA claim could be waived.”54 It found no need to resolve this paradox, however,
because it decided the case on a different ground. The Court noted that the arbitral provision did
not expressly authorize arbitrators to interpret and apply external law.
“[W]e will not infer from a general contractual provision that the
parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the
undertaking is ‘explicitly stated.’ More succinctly, the waiver must
be clear and unmistakable.”55
Since the arbitral clause did not “clearly and unmistakably” waive Mr. Wright’s access to judicial
procedures with respect to his ADA claim, the Supreme Court refused to require him to resort to
that private forum.
Given the Supreme Court’s recent cases directing parties to arbitrate various statutory
claims ranging from securities act and antitrust suits to civil rights actions, it is unlikely the Court
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will soon reverse course. Although some individuals might argue that the enforcement of
employment discrimination laws should not be subject to private arbitral adjudications due to the
important public policies involved,56 it is clear from Gilmer and the reaffirmation of that decision
in Wright that this position is unlikely to prevail.57 As a result, the critical question concerns the
prerequisites that must be satisfied before courts direct litigants raising employment
discrimination claims to resolve their disputes through arbitral proceedings.
The minimal pre-litigation deferral standard was set forth in Wright – the party requesting
arbitration of statutory disputes must demonstrate a “clear and unmistakable” intention by the
contracting parties to resolve the statutory rights in question through arbitration. Application of
this standard will frequently preclude arbitral deferral in cases covered by bargaining agreement
grievance-arbitration provisions. Such clauses have historically empowered arbitrators to
interpret and apply only the express terms of the bargaining agreement.58 The neutral adjudicators
are usually not authorized to enforce external law. Even general nondiscrimination provisions in
collective contracts should not be equated with Title VII and other civil rights enactments. These
contractual prohibitions may not incorporate the same substantive rules, proof constructs, and
remedial doctrines applicable under the different employment discrimination laws.
If a bargaining agreement arbitration clause specifically empowers presiding neutrals to
interpret and apply employment discrimination laws, courts must decide whether to defer civil
rights claims to arbitration.59 Courts should only defer to arbitration if the arbitrators are not only
authorized to interpret and apply the relevant statutes, but also to issue remedial awards
consistent with those available under those laws. If only back pay were available for
discriminatory treatment actions, deferral should be denied, because this procedure would
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deprive claimants of the compensatory and punitive damages that could be awarded under
Section 1981A.
Following the Gilmer decision, many nonunion companies unilaterally created arbitration
programs designed to prevent employees from litigating employment discrimination claims in
federal courts.60 These can be problematic, because the employers usually established these
systems without meaningful consultation with their employees. The firms have prescribed the
rules, they often select and compensate the arbitrators, and impose these arbitral provisions on all
present and future workers. If these arbitration plans are to be accepted by courts, judges should
require “clear and unmistakable” employee acceptance of the arbitral undertakings. Large, bold,
or italicized language should apprise individuals of the specific types of legal claims subject to
arbitration, and the neutral adjudicators should be expressly empowered to apply the relevant
substantive and remedial standards associated with the pertinent enactments.61
Enlightened employers also include the fundamental procedural rights set forth in the
“Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship” developed by a Task Force consisting of representatives from the
National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the Labor and Employment Law Section of the ABA.62
These standards recognize the right of claimants to be represented by individuals of their own
choosing, the possibility of employer reimbursement for at least some of claimant attorney fees,
especially for lower wage workers, adequate claimant access to “all information reasonably
relevant to mediation and/or arbitration of their claims,” and the right to hearings before qualified
and impartial arbitrators drawn from lists of diversified neutrals.63 The Protocol also encourages
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the development of special training programs to educate presiding neutrals with respect to the
substantive and procedural issues pertinent to employment discrimination cases. Similar due
process concerns were expressed by the Dunlop Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations.64
Some people may be concerned that private arbitration agreements will not protect
worker statutory rights as effectively as judicial proceedings. If basic due process rights are not
guaranteed, this would probably be true. On the other hand, protracted and expensive judicial
proceedings may cause many claimants to give up or accept minimal settlements, because of their
inability to afford the costs of discovery and the delays associated with backlogged civil dockets.
This factor clearly favors defendants that have the financial resources to litigate these cases
thoroughly. 65 Fair arbitral procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive
alternative that may benefit workers more than judicial proceedings.66 The availability of arbitral
procedures can also decrease the pressure on employers to settle questionable claims in an effort
to avoid the extreme costs of litigation.67
Lower courts asked to enforce arbitration agreements set forth in individual employment
contracts or applicable personnel policies – as opposed to labor-management bargaining
agreements governed by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act68 – act pursuant to
the authority granted courts in Sections 2-4 of the FAA.69 Section 2 provides that arbitration
agreements are enforceable, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”70 Section 4 grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce
arbitration agreements, and Section 3 authorizes federal courts to enjoin other judicial
proceedings involving claims that are subject to arbitral resolution. When the FAA is applicable
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to private arbitration agreements, state arbitration doctrines are preempted, and both federal and
state courts are obliged to apply uniform federal enforcement standards.71
Although the FAA grants courts expansive authority to enforce private arbitration
agreements, courts should recognize the unique nature of employment discrimination claims. In
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court acknowledged the important public policies embodied in
federal civil rights legislation, and indicated that courts should not give undue deference to
private dispute resolution procedures. To balance the policies set forth in both the FAA and the
relevant employment discrimination enactments, courts should establish arbitral deferral
standards that require adherence to strict prerequisites before individuals with discrimination
claims are required to submit their disputes to arbitral procedures.
Given the controversial nature of arbitral deferral under Gilmer, it would be beneficial for
the EEOC to issue guidelines – or for Congress to amend the civil rights statutes – to prescribe a
set of minimal deferral standards. This approach would be similar to the one taken by Congress
in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act72 amendment to Section 626(f) of the ADEA73
requiring the satisfaction of various safeguards as a prerequisite to valid employee waivers of
ADEA rights.
The arbitration provisions in employment applications and letters of employment should
be delineated in large, bold, or italicized print to call attention to their inclusion. The language
should clearly indicate the types of employment discrimination claims subject to arbitral
resolution. Arbitrators should be expressly empowered to apply the relevant substantive
standards and applicable remedial doctrines pertaining to the different employment
discrimination enactments.
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The EEOC, the American Arbitration Association, and the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service should maintain lists of neutral adjudicators who possess the minimal
qualifications expected of individuals authorized to preside over such cases. These persons
should have a minimum of forty hours of training with respect to both substantive and procedural
employment discrimination law and arbitral rules of procedure.74 They should be generally
acceptable in the labor/management community.
Courts are divided with respect to the enforceability of employer-created arbitration
systems that require claimants to share the arbitral costs. While employment discrimination
claimants must assume the costs of their own legal representatives, subject to court-ordered
reimbursement to prevailing plaintiffs, they do not have to share the costs of the judges who
preside over their trials. As a result, several courts have refused to enforce private arbitration
agreements that require claimants to help defray arbitrator costs. They reasonably believe that
this practice may deter claimants with limited financial resources from vindicating their statutory
rights.75 Other courts, however, have not been willing to accept such a blanket policy against the
enforcement of arbitral agreements requiring claimants to assume some arbitrator costs. When it
appears that claimants can afford the costs involved, they enforce the underlying arbitration
provisions.76
In labor-management grievance-arbitration, the arbitral costs are generally shared by the
employers and the representative labor organizations. When civil rights plaintiffs file suit in
federal courts, the government assumes responsibility for the judicial costs involved. If
employers decide to establish their own arbitration systems to prevent their employees from
litigating employment discrimination claims in federal courts, I believe those employers should
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bear the costs of the arbitral proceedings. If claimants were required to share responsibility for
those costs, they would not be accorded proceedings comparable to those they would receive in
federal court.
The optimal situation would require the EEOC to pay the costs of arbitral proceedings, to
avoid the appearance of partiality associated with systems in which employers pay such costs.77 If
the EEOC lacked the funds to cover these costs, employers should be required to do so.78 This
practice would recognize the reality that most claimants lack the financial resources to assume
even a partial share of arbitral costs – and the fact that these employer-created arbitral systems
are designed to preclude employee access to more protracted and more expensive judicial
proceedings.
Although I believe that employers should be obliged to pay for the costs of arbitration, to
avoid unconscionable burdens on individual claimants, this practice should not enable those
firms to control arbitrator selection. Workers should have the right to participate equally in the
selection process and be entitled to challenge any arbitrator candidate they think might not be
entirely impartial.79 Claimants should have the right to know which arbitrators have heard prior
cases involving their employer and be provided with confidential access to the previous awards
issued by those neutrals. The availability of this information would diminish the “repeat player”
benefit that may accrue to employers that regularly select arbitrators who might feel that proemployer decisions in close cases would be likely to generate more frequent future selections.80
An alternative procedure could authorize the EEOC either to name the arbitrators who will
decide employment discrimination cases or to provide a list of five qualified neutrals from which
the employer and the claimant would choose the most acceptable adjudicator.81
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Minimal discovery rules should be included in applicable arbitral procedures to allow
claimants to prepare adequately for trial. Under Section 7 of the FAA,82 arbitrators possess the
authority to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses. Claimants should have the right to be
represented throughout this process by legal counsel of their own choosing. Full and fair hearings
should also be guaranteed.
Should private arbitration agreements restrict the right of the EEOC to litigate
employment discrimination claims on behalf of charging parties? In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co.,83 the court ruled that the EEOC could seek injunctive relief on behalf of claimants covered
by arbitral agreements, but not monetary relief. The court decided that monetary relief would
circumvent the obligation of claimants to seek such personal redress through arbitral
procedures.84 Some might argue that private arbitration provisions should not constrain the right
of the EEOC to sue on behalf of individual claimants.85 This would allow the EEOC to pursue
cases raising critical legal issues despite the availability to the claimants of arbitral procedures.
Since the overwhelming majority of employment discrimination cases are fact-based
discriminatory treatment claims in which the plaintiffs must prove that their respective employers
discriminated against them because of impermissible factors, rarely are significant legal issues
involved. It would thus not be inappropriate to deny the EEOC the right to litigate individual
claims covered by private arbitration agreements in federal court, whether the agency is seeking
legal damages or equitable injunctive relief. The EEOC should, however, be empowered to
participate in the resulting arbitral hearings on behalf of the claimants, and have the right to
challenge the propriety of any awards it believes are contrary to applicable legal doctrines. So
long as reviewing courts engage in sufficiently searching analyses of legal conclusions reached
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by private arbitrators, uniform national standards could be preserved.
The one exception to this preclusion rule should pertain to class action claims. Whenever
plaintiff representatives are able to obtain Rule 23 class certification or the EEOC decides to
prosecute pattern or practice claims, neither suit should be constrained by private arbitration
agreements that are designed to resolve individual disputes. The overarching group interests
associated with class and pattern or practice cases should not be subject to private resolution.
They should instead be handled through traditional judicial procedures under the supervision of
persons with the expertise required to conduct such expansive proceedings.
E. STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRIOR ARBITRALAWARDS
ENFORCING STATUTORY RIGHTS
After arbitral awards have been issued with respect to cases involving the application of
federal employment discrimination enactments, losing parties may challenge or refuse to comply
with those decisions. How much deference should reviewing courts give to those arbitral
determinations? In conventional grievance-arbitration cases arising from collective bargaining
agreement disputes, the Supreme Court has been unusually deferential. Grievance arbitration
awards are to be enforced so long as they draw their essence from the applicable contract and are
not contrary to law or public policy.86 This generous deferral standard is based on the fact that
arbitrators who interpret and apply bargaining agreement provisions are part of the collective
bargaining process and are acting as the designated readers of the collective contracts reached by
the negotiating parties.87 Even when judges disagree with arbitral determinations, they may not
reject them unless they contravene “well defined and dominant” public policies.88
When arbitration awards arise from non-bargaining agreement provisions, the FAA
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requires courts to enforce those arbitral determinations except where the decisions were procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means, there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
the arbitrators were guilty of serious procedural misconduct, or the presiding neutrals exceeded
their powers or imperfectly executed their authority.89 These standards are entirely appropriate in
cases involving the arbitral resolution of disputes arising under private contracts. The parties
have defined their own rights and have designated arbitration as the means to enforce those
rights. On the other hand, where private employment contracts authorize private arbitrators to
determine external public rights set forth in federal employment discrimination statutes, different
considerations arise.90
Arbitrators interpreting and applying external statutes are no longer functioning as
extensions of the negotiating parties. They are not merely interpreting private contractual
provisions. They are acting as substitutes for the federal judges who would otherwise hear those
public rights disputes. As a result, stricter standards of judicial deference should be applied, with
distinctions being drawn between factual findings and legal conclusions. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Gardner-Denver, lower courts should give substantial deference to the factual
determinations of arbitrators, so long as the proceedings have been fair and regular. Judges
should be certain that fundamental principles of due process have been observed. It would also
be beneficial to require written transcripts of the arbitral hearings and arbitrator awards that
clearly summarize and address the pertinent factual questions. Since most civil rights claims
involve discriminatory treatment claims in which findings of employer motivations are crucial,
most judicial review cases will merely have to evaluate the basic propriety of arbitrator factual
conclusions.
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When legal interpretations are involved, stricter judicial scrutiny should be required.
District courts should apply the same standards that would be applied by appellate courts asked
to review the legal conclusions of trial judges.91 Courts should be certain that arbitrators have
issued decisions consistent with: (1) the pertinent substantive standards; (2) the relevant proof
constructs and procedural rules; and (3) the applicable remedial doctrines. Such review principles
would prevent the uneven application of federal employment discrimination laws by private
arbitrators,92 and guarantee a system of relatively uniform national standards.

V. USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
As a result of the expansion of employment discrimination protection through the
enactment of the ADEA, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the number of charges filed
with the EEOC has risen to approximately 80,000 per year.93 The number of discrimination
complaints filed in federal district courts now exceeds 22,000 annually. 94 These cases are rapidly
approaching 10 percent of all federal court civil adjudications.
Two-thirds of employment discrimination judgments result in verdicts for defendants,
and the verdicts won by plaintiffs tend to be under $150,000 per case.95 If Congress decided to
reduce the civil dockets of federonsider amendments to the various employment discrimination
enactments that would require most discrimination claims to be resolved through administrative
proceedings before the EEOC. Any statutory changes in this regard should consider an
adjudication system similar to the one currently employed to enforce the mandates of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).96
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A. NLRB ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Section 8 of the NLRA97 proscribes various unfair labor practices by employers and labor
organizations. Section 1098 describes the administrative procedures to be followed when unfair
labor practices are alleged to have occurred. A party adversely affected by allegedly unlawful
conduct must file an unfair labor practice charge with the appropriate regional office of the
NLRB within six months from the date of the conduct in question. A Board agent investigates
the allegations to ascertain the facts and to determine whether it appears that a statutory violation
has occurred. Appropriate witnesses are interviewed, and written accounts of the information
they provide are prepared. If the Board agent concludes that no improper conduct has taken
place, he or she recommends dismissal of the charge. On the other hand, if the agent decides that
a violation has probably occurred, he or she recommends the issuance of a formal complaint.
Parties dissatisfied by the regional office’s refusal to issue a complaint may appeal that
determination to the General Counsel’s office in Washington, D.C. Attorneys in that office
review the regional office fact findings and legal analysis to determine whether their refusal to
issue a complaint was correct. If so, the charge is dismissed, and that decision is final. No party
may seek judicial review of the General Counsel’s refusal to issue a complaint.99 On the other
hand, if the regional office or the General Counsel’s office decides to issue a complaint, the
charged party is given a copy of the complaint and asked to file an answer.
During their investigation of unfair labor practice charges, regional office agents
frequently act as settlement facilitators. They meet with representatives of the charging parties
and the respondents and encourage settlement discussions. These often result in non-Board
settlements that directly involve the specific parties involved. Other cases are settled through
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informal Board settlements in which the alleged violator agrees to rectify any violation and post
an official NLRB notice advising employees of their rights under the NLRA.100 Many unfair
labor practice claims are amicably resolved through non-Board and informal Board settlements.
If a complaint cannot be settled, a hearing is scheduled before an administrative law judge
(ALJ). The charging party is represented at no cost by an NLRB attorney acting on behalf of the
General Counsel.101 Minimal discovery procedures are available to litigants. A formal hearing is
conducted by an ALJ. A Board attorney presents the evidence on behalf of the charging party. If
General Counsel witnesses have provided regional office investigators with fact statements, the
respondent is entitled to copies of those statements after their direct examination. After the Board
lawyer has presented the case in chief, the respondent makes its presentation. If the ALJ
determines that no violation has occurred, he or she recommends dismissal of the complaint. On
the other hand, if a violation is found, the ALJ issues a recommended order designed to remedy
the unfair labor practice.
Many parties accept ALJ determinations and comply with those awards voluntarily.
Others appeal the ALJ conclusions to the NLRB which reviews the ALJ findings and the briefs
filed by the parties. Oral arguments are rarely conducted by the NLRB. The Labor Board then
decides whether to affirm, reverse, or modify the ALJ findings.
Even though Labor Board decisions are not self-enforcing, numerous litigants recognize
the propriety of those determinations and voluntarily comply. Losing parties may alternatively
petition courts of appeal for judicial review. If losing parties do not seek judicial review but
refuse to comply with recommended Board orders, the NLRB must petition appropriate courts of
appeals for enforcement orders. In both judicial review and NLRB-initiated enforcement
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proceedings, NLRB factual findings are entitled to judicial acceptance so long as they are
“supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.”102 While NLRB legal
conclusions are not accorded such conclusive judicial respect, appellate courts frequently defer to
the legal determinations made by the expert administrative agency created by Congress to
interpret and enforce the NLRA. Parties that fail to comply with judicially enforced Board
remedial orders are subject to contempt sanctions.
The vast majority of unfair labor practice cases are resolved at the regional office level,
most without the need for formal ALJ hearings. Of the 33,439 unfair labor practice cases closed
in 1997, 30.5 percent were withdrawn by the charging parties before complaints were issued,
29.4 percent were administratively dismissed prior to the issuance of complaints, and 35.9
percent were settled or adjusted before ALJ decisions were issued.103 Only 1.8 percent of the
cases closed were decided by the NLRB in contested cases, and fewer than 1 percent reached
courts of appeals via petitions for review or enforcement.
It is interesting to note that the NLRB has arbitral deferral rules that are similar to those
followed by the Supreme Court in employment discrimination cases. When unfair labor practice
charges are filed that involve issues subject to resolution through arbitration procedures set forth
in bargaining agreements, the Labor Board will direct the disputing parties to use those private
adjudication procedures.104 Once arbitral decisions have been issued, if losing parties seek Board
intervention, NLRB involvement will be denied so long as “the proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision . . . is not clearly repugnant
to the purposes and policies of the Act.”105
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B. USE OF NLRB-TYPE PROCEDURES TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
The use of NLRB-type administrative procedures by the EEOC could greatly expedite the
resolution of employment discrimination cases. Victims of unlawful discrimination would
usually be able to obtain faster and less expensive redress, and defendants with meritorious
defenses would not feel the pressure to offer claimants sizable settlements simply to avoid costly
judicial litigation.
Since many district judges are understandably reluctant to grant defendant summary
judgment motions in even questionable cases, defendants are obliged to incur substantial legal
costs when defending unmeritorious claims. The discovery process is extensive, and judicial
proceedings are often protracted. Furthermore, since courts rarely award attorney fees to
prevailing defendants, winning defendants must absorb their own legal costs. The use of
administrative enforcement procedures could greatly reduce litigation costs and expedite the
resolution of contested cases.
If NLRB-type procedures were to be adopted for employment discrimination cases
governed by the EEOC, certain procedural modifications would be required. Congress would
have to greatly expand the EEOC’s budget, recognizing that the money committed to the
administrative process would be far less than the money saved by having these claims removed
from federal courts. Additional EEOC regional offices would have to be created to provide
national coverage. The regional offices would have to be staffed by sufficient numbers of people
to permit the thorough and prompt investigation of all employment discrimination charges.
Regional attorneys would then be authorized to prepare reports indicating whether they believe
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that statutory violations have occurred. Negative conclusions could be appealed to the General
Counsel’s office in Washington, D.C.
When the General Counsel’s office finds no cause to believe that violations have
occurred, charging parties could be denied the right to use EEOC administrative procedures or
judicial forums to litigate their cases. This approach would significantly reduce the number of
unmeritorious cases taken to trial. It would also decrease the economic pressure on defendants to
settle unfounded claims.
Congress may not wish to make General Counsel office no-cause findings conclusive,
believing that claimants with no-cause findings should still be able to litigate their cases before
appropriate forums. To discourage clearly meritless suits, Congress could amend the employment
discrimination statutes to authorize – or even mandate – the awarding of attorney fees to
defendants who successfully defend suits prosecuted by plaintiffs whose claims were found
meritless by agents of the General Counsel’s office. In recognition of the fact that many plaintiffs
may lack the financial resources to satisfy such attorney fee awards, Congress could authorize
judges to impose attorney fee obligations on both losing plaintiffs and their attorneys, to
discourage lawyers from filing frivolous claims in an effort to extort undeserved settlement offers
from defendants.
Congress should decide whether it believes that private arbitration proceedings should be
used to resolve employment discrimination claims. If it agrees with the Supreme Court’s Gilmer
approach and the Collyer Insulated Wire practice by the NLRB, it should amend the different
employment discrimination statutes to authorize pre-adjudication deferral to arbitration by the
EEOC of all cases subject to resolution by labor-management or employer-established arbitration
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procedures. As noted earlier, such deferral should only be mandated where the applicable arbitral
programs expressly authorize arbitrators to apply the relevant federal enactments, to follow the
relevant substantive principles and proof constructs, and to issue remedial orders consistent with
those available before the EEOC. Claims not subject to arbitral resolution, would be subject to
EEOC administrative determinations.
When EEOC attorneys find cause to believe that violations have occurred, the EEOC
could use General Counsel agents to represent the charging parties during the adjudication
process. Given the substantial number of civil rights claims filed with the EEOC each year, this
practice would be costly. Hundreds of EEOC attorneys would be required to represent all of the
parties with seemingly valid discrimination claims. The EEOC budget would have to be
increased in a manner that might not be politically acceptable given existing budget constraints.
An alternative system could be used that would be more cost efficient. Free EEOC
representation could be provided in important cases, as may currently be done under the 1972
amendments to Title VII which empower EEOC lawyers to bring judicial actions on behalf of
charging parties. In less significant cases, however, EEOC attorneys would not be available. The
charging parties would have to obtain their own lawyers to prosecute their claims. Most
claimants would be able to retain attorneys on contingent fee bases, with their lawyers charging a
share of any settlements agreed upon. Attorneys who successfully litigate cases on behalf of
claimants would be able to request attorney fee awards as they may presently do under the
different statutes.
If Congress were to decide to authorize the administrative resolution of contested
employment discrimination claims, it would have to appropriate sufficient funds to enable the
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EEOC to employ a sufficient number of ALJs to hear the volume of cases that would be
involved. If an insufficient number of ALJs were available, case backlogs would develop and the
principal advantage of administrative proceedings would be lost. The cost of these ALJs would
be more than offset by the caseload reduction that would be experienced by district court judges
who would no longer have to preside over these cases.
If administrative procedures are to work efficiently with respect to the adjudication of
employment discrimination cases, it would be necessary to guarantee a group of qualified
administrative law judges. It would not be appropriate to use generic ALJs for this purpose. A
group of trial experts with special knowledge of the pertinent substantive doctrines and
applicable employment discrimination proof constructs would be crucial. It would thus be
beneficial for Congress to direct the creation of a separate group of ALJs with the requisite
knowledge of equal employment opportunity law.
Extremely limited discovery procedures are currently available in proceedings conducted
in NLRB proceedings. While this approach may be appropriate with respect to NLRA cases, it
would not be efficient or fair regarding employment discrimination cases. Plaintiffs rarely
possess the information they need to determine initially if they have been the victims of
impermissible discrimination. They are either given no information concerning the actions they
plan to challenge or they are provided with nondiscriminatory explanations. If Congress were to
provide the EEOC with administrative enforcement authority, it should amend the applicable
civil rights statutes to provide claimants and respondents with adequate discovery rights.
Both claimants and respondents should be given copies of interview statements obtained
by EEOC agents while they are investigating discrimination charges. They should also have the
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right to file motions to produce relevant documents, to seek answers to appropriate
interrogatories, and to depose pertinent parties. ALJs assigned to specific cases would supervise
the discovery process to guarantee parties adequate trial preparation and to ensure that
unnecessarily burdensome tactics are not being employed.
The EEOC should designate certain trained ALJs as settlement judges who would be
required to conduct settlement conferences in all pending cases. All relevant parties would be
required to participate in these formal conferences, and these settlement ALJs would have the
right to conduct mediation sessions designed to avoid the need for formal adjudications. Despite
the fact that EEOC agents may have previously engaged in conciliation efforts during the
invesitgative process, it is the immediacy of trial that often induces recalcitrant litigants to
contemplate more seriously the benefits that may be achieved through additional pre-trial
mediation.
Claims that cannot be resolved through settlement discussions would be scheduled for
trial before ALJs. Would the use of such administrative resolution procedures unconstitutionally
deprive claimants or respondents of their Seventh Amendment right to jury trials? In the
relatively small number of disparate impact cases brought by claimants adversely affected by
facially neutral job requirements that disqualify greater percentages of different groups protected
by the different civil rights enactments, this would not be a problem. Such plaintiffs are not
entitled to seek compensatory or punitive damages under Section 1981A, thus no constitutional
right to a jury trial would be available. They would only be entitled to equitable injunctive relief
and back pay that has been traditionally awarded in equity proceedings and can clearly be
resolved through administrative proceedings.106

44
The jury trial issue is most significant for plaintiffs prosecuting discriminatory treatment
claims who request compensatory and punitive damages. When Congress added Section 1981A,
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to authorize the awarding of limited compensatory and
punitive damages in such cases, it explicitly authorized resort to jury trials by either party.107 This
was based upon the belief that claimants seeking such traditional legal damages had a right to
jury determinations. Congress might endeavor to circumvent this problem by authorizing the use
of administrative juries. It could authorize ALJs to conduct discriminatory treatment trials before
six, nine, or twelve member administrative juries. Since such jury trials would still be presided
over by Article I administrative judges, rather than Article III life-tenure judges, such a procedure
might still contravene the Seventh Amendment.108 In addition, the use of administrative juries
would greatly diminish the benefits to be derived from streamlined administrative procedures. If
the EEOC were required to conduct regular jury trials in all discriminatory treatment cases, the
advantages of having claims disposed of through administrative adjudications would be greatly
diminished.
In Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,109
the Supreme Court sustained the right of Congress to establish an administrative agency to
enforce newly-created federal health and safety standards. “Congress has often created new
statutory obligations, provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively
to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred.
These statutory schemes have been sustained by this Court.”110 The critical factor is not simply
the form of relief involved, but the “public” or “private” nature of the rights being enforced.
“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to an
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administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the
Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’”111
The various employment discrimination statutes involve both “private” and “public”
rights. The specific individuals who file claims under those enactments may believe that they are
asserting wholly “private” rights, but the strong government interest in the elimination of
pernicious discrimination renders the rights created by these laws “public.” The “public” nature
of employment discrimination claims was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in
Gardner-Denver.112 Under these circumstances, Congress would probably have the right to
assign the adjudication of employment discrimination claims to Article I administrative
procedures rather than to Article III judicial forums.113
If Congress wished to minimize Seventh Amendment questions, it could amend Section
1981A to eliminate the availability of punitive damages. If only back pay and compensatory
damages were available, ALJs would probably be able to resolve the claims without the need for
jury trials. The elimination of punitive damages would have a minimal impact on claimants.
Exemplary relief is awarded in relatively few cases, since it is limited to situations in which
defendants behavior evidenced a “reckless indifference to the federally protected” rights
involved.114 In addition, the statutory limits imposed by Section 1981A of between $50,000 and
$300,000 per claimant for compensatory and punitive damages, based upon the number of
employees involved, would frequently preclude any punitive award above the compensatory
damages that would otherwise be included.
Parties who are dissatisfied with ALJ determinations should have the right to petition the
EEOC for review. Given the thousands of cases that would be involved, the EEOC should
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probably follow the review procedures used by the NLRB. Petitioners and respondents would be
asked to file briefs. The EEOC would review these briefs, the transcripts, exhibits, and ALJ
decisions. Oral arguments should rarely be necessary, with the written submissions being
sufficient in most instances to determine whether the ALJs had acted properly. Factual findings
should be accorded substantial deference so long as they are supported by the evidence in the
record. Legal analysis should be subjected to more thorough evaluation to guarantee both fidelity
to the applicable statutes and national consistency.
There is no reason for all five EEOC members to examine each petition for review. The
Commission could use panels of three members to review most cases. Only where significant
legal questions are presented or previous Commission decisions are in conflict should full
Commission participation be required. To assist the EEOC with the increased work load,
Congress might wish to expand the Commission to seven or perhaps even nine members. This
would be in recognition of the fact they would be performing much of the work currently being
performed by both district court and court of appeals judges. In most cases, parties that fail to
prevail before ALJs and the EEOC would accept those decisions and seek no further review.
Parties aggrieved by final EEOC decisions should have the right to judicial review.
Congress might authorize federal district courts to carry out this function, but it would be more
efficient to assign this task to courts of appeals. Trial courts are not usually employed to review
adjudications conducted by others, and they are terribly busy with their own trial dockets.
Congress should thus consider the current NLRA system in which final Labor Board unfair labor
practice determinations are subject to court of appeals review.
If administrative procedures were adopted for the resolution of employment
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discrimination claims, I would suggest one critical modification of NLRA practice. I would have
EEOC decisions self-enforcing, subject to the right of aggrieved parties to request judicial
review. Parties that failed to comply voluntarily and did not request appellate court stays of
EEOC mandates should be subject to contempt sanctions in federal district court proceedings.
This would eliminate the need for EEOC attorneys to petition courts of appeals for enforcement
orders in cases in which losing parties did not comply. Facing the possibility of contempt
sanctions, most losing respondents would undoubtedly comply, with truly aggrieved parties
seeking judicial review.
What standards should be applied by appellate courts when they reviewed EEOC
decisions? It would be proper for Congress to indicate that EEOC factual determination are
conclusive when they are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
Reasonable judicial deference should be extended to legal interpretations made by the expert
administrative agency established by Congress to apply the different employment discrimination
enactments. Only when reviewing courts decide that agency interpretations are inconsistent with
statutory mandates or conflict with prior appellate court decisions interpreting the same
provisions should EEOC statutory constructions be reversed. The adoption of these two factual
and legal review standards would discourage frivolous appeals. If parties realized that courts of
appeals would be unlikely to overturn the decisions they had lost before the EEOC, few would
undertake the expense of further litigation.
If Congress were to contemplate the substitution of administrative proceedings for
judicial adjudications with respect to employment discrimination claims, proponents and
opponents would undoubtedly voice strong opinions. I do not have a strong personal opinion
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concerning this issue. Federal judges are dissatisfied with the number of relatively low value
discrimination claims that continue to be tried in district courts. On the other hand, civil rights
leaders might consider a shift to administrative proceedings an indication that employment
discrimination cases are no longer high priority items. As one who specializes in labor and
employment law, I do not share this concern. I think that the NLRB treats unfair labor practice
cases as seriously as federal district judges would. In fact, one might suspect that specialized
agencies like the NLRB and the EEOC are even more concerned about the claims that come
before them. The individuals appointed to those agencies are usually specialists in their fields,
and are normally committed to the enforcement of the underlying statutory schemes. In the
employment discrimination area, claimant advocates recognize the number of unmeritorious
charges filed by individuals who are unaware of the actual facts and defense lawyers realize that
employment discrimination continues to occur and must be eradicated.
If effective administrative procedures were established and Congress provided the EEOC
with the funds it would require to administer such a program efficiently, most claims would be
processed fairly and expeditiously. Individuals with valid claims would be likely to obtain
prompt redress, because respondents facing ALJ trial dates within the coming months would act
swiftly to resolve the cases they would be likely to lose at trial. Respondents would benefit from
the reduced costs of litigation, the faster rejection of frivolous claims, and the prompt
adjudication of close cases.
If Congress were to move toward the use of administrative procedures to resolve
employment discrimination cases, one group of claims should be exempted. Class actions
brought by private parties and pattern or practice cases prosecuted by EEOC or Justice
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Department attorneys115 should continue fall within the jurisdiction of federal district courts. The
amounts of money involved are usually significant, and the legal questions affecting large
numbers of people can be momentous. Once a district court judge certifies a class action under
Rule 23 or the EEOC decides to prosecute a pattern or practice suit against private parties or the
Justice Department initiates such an action against state or local government employers, EEOC
adjudication authority should be supplanted by district court jurisdiction. If class status is denied,
however, the claims should be returned to the EEOC for further administrative proceedings.

VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a significant increase in the number of employment discrimination claims
filed each year with the EEOC and prosecuted in federal courts. Most of the charges investigated
by EEOC personnel are found to lack merit. The charges found meritorious tend to involve
relatively small monetary sums, yet occupy almost ten percent of federal court civil dockets. If
EEOC representatives had the resources to thoroughly investigate all charges, they would be able
to resolve many by convincing parties filing apparently unmeritorious claims to forego further
action and by inducing respondents to settle seemingly valid claims. The use of formal mediation
procedures with respect to all realistic claims would further contribute to amicable resolutions.
Most collective bargaining agreements contain non-discrimination provisions enforceable
through binding arbitration procedures, and many non-union firms have adopted arbitral systems
designed to resolve employment discrimination disputes. The Supreme Court has been willing to
require the exhaustion of such arbitral procedures before federal court adjudications may occur.
The EEOC and the courts should establish guidelines that will ensure that the rights of both
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claimants and respondents will be preserved in those arbitral forums.
If Congress really wants to diminish the use of federal courts to adjudicate employment
discrimination claims, it may decide to adopt procedures similar to those presently used by the
NLRB to resolve unfair labor practice claims. Administrative law judges could hear such cases,
with ALJ determinations being subject to EEOC review. Final EEOC decisions could be
reviewed by courts of appeals. Since these administrative procedures would be used to enforce
“public” rights, the absence of jury trials would probably not contravene Seventh Amendment
principles, especially if punitive damages were no longer available to claimants.
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